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Abstract—Passive RFID technology is widely used in user
authentication and access control. We propose RF-Rhythm, a
secure and usable two-factor RFID authentication system with
strong resilience to lost/stolen/cloned RFID cards. In RF-Rhythm,
each legitimate user performs a sequence of taps on his/her RFID
card according to a self-chosen secret melody. Such rhythmic
taps can induce phase changes in the backscattered signals,
which the RFID reader can detect to recover the user’s tapping
rhythm. In addition to verifying the RFID card’s identification
information as usual, the backend server compares the extracted
tapping rhythm with what it acquires in the user enrollment
phase. The user passes authentication checks if and only if both
verifications succeed. We also propose a novel phase-hopping
protocol in which the RFID reader emits Continuous Wave (CW)
with random phases for extracting the user’s secret tapping
rhythm. Our protocol can prevent a capable adversary from
extracting and then replaying a legitimate tapping rhythm from
sniffed RFID signals. Comprehensive user experiments confirm
the high security and usability of RF-Rhythm with false-positive
and false-negative rates close to zero.
I. INTRODUCTION
Passive (battery-less) RFID technology has been widely
used in user authentication and access control. An RFID
system consists of a backend server, RFID readers, and RFID
cards (tags). An RFID reader sends wireless signals to inter-
rogate a nearby RFID card, which returns its identification
information by backscattering the reader’s signals. The RFID
reader then forwards the received information to the backend
server for comparison with the stored information. If a match
is found, the RFID user passes authentication and is permitted
to access critical resources or enter a protected area such as a
business building, parking garage, car, or even home.
Lost/stolen/cloned RFID cards pose the most critical threat
to RFID authentication systems. In particular, RFID cards are
often of small size and can be easily lost or stolen; they
can also be cloned with many cheap existing tools. Since
RFID cards are not password-protected, the adversary can
use a lost/stolen/cloned RFID card to pass authentication and
impersonate the legitimate user. An effective countermeasure
can be two-factor authentication which requires the RFID
user to present the second piece of identification information.
One such solution requires the RFID user to additionally
input a PIN code on a keypad [1]. It not only diminishes
the convenience of contactless RFID authentication but also
requires a nontrivial infrastructure update to existing RFID
systems. Another plausible solution is exploring commercial
mobile 2FA solutions such as Duo Mobile [2], which require
the RFID user to manually acknowledge an authentication
request on his/her enrolled smartphone. This solution needs the
RFID user to own and always carry a smartphone with good
network connectivity, which may not be feasible in practice.
We propose RF-Rhythm, a secure and usable two-
factor RFID authentication system with strong resilience to
lost/stolen/cloned RFID cards. In RF-Rhythm, each legitimate
user performs a sequence of taps on his/her RFID card
according to a self-chosen secret melody. Such rhythmic taps
can induce phase changes in the backscattered signals, which
the RFID reader can detect to recover the user’s rhythm. In ad-
dition to verifying the RFID card’s identification information
as usual, the backend server compares the recovered rhythm
with what it acquires in the user enrollment phase. The user
passes authentication only if both verifications succeed.
The security, usability, and feasibility of RF-Rhythm lie
in many aspects. First, a user can easily select a secret yet
familiar song segment which is very difficult for others to
guess. Second, different users may interpret the same song
segment in various ways, resulting in diverse rhythmic tap
patterns on the card. This means that even if the adversary
knows the secret song segment, it may still have great difficulty
performing the correct tapping rhythm on the RFID card.
Third, RF-Rhythm is naturally resilient to traditional replay
and relay attacks on RFID authentication systems. Fourth, the
phase information of backscattered signals is readily available
on commercial RFID readers, so RF-Rhythm only needs a
minor software update to the RFID reader and backend system.
Finally, RF-Rhythm applies to COTS RFID cards and does not
need the user to carry any other device.
Although rhythm-based authentication has been proposed
for smartphones [3] and smartwatches [4], we are the first to
explore it in RFID systems and face two unique challenges.
The first challenge is rhythm detection and classification,
i.e., how to detect and verify the tapping rhythm from
noisy RFID signals. In previous work [3], [4], rhythmic taps
are directly performed on mobile devices and are fairly easy
to detect from inertial sensors. In contrast, rhythmic taps in
RF-Rhythm are performed on the RFID card and have to
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be indirectly extracted from noisy backscattered signals. We
explore various signal processing techniques to process noisy
raw phase data for extracting a reliable tapping rhythm. We
also use machine learning techniques to train a classifier the
backend server uses to validate an extracted tapping rhythm.
The second challenge is anti-eavesdropping, i.e., how to
prevent the adversary from acquiring the user’s tapping
rhythm from sniffed RFID signals. In particular, the ad-
versary can easily eavesdrop on the open RFID channel and
then behave in the same way as the RFID reader to decode
the user’s tapping rhythm from intercepted RFID signals. It
can then repeat the rhythmic taps on lost/stolen/cloned RFID
card to successfully impersonate the legitimate user. We tackle
this challenge by a novel phase-hopping protocol in which
the RFID reader emits Continuous Wave (CW) with random
phases for extracting the user’s tapping rhythm. Since the
adversary does not know the phase-hopping sequence, it can
no longer extract the correct tapping rhythm from sniffed RFID
signals.
We thoroughly evaluate the security and usability of RF-
Rhythm by comprehensive experiments on Impinj RFID read-
ers, COTS passive tags, and USRP devices. Our experiments
involve 19 volunteers from two countries and explore three
representative machine learning techniques, including Support
Vector Machine (SVM), Neural Networks (NN), and Convo-
lutional Neural Networks (CNN). We show that RF-Rhythm
is highly secure with false-positive and false-negative rates
close to zero. In addition, we demonstrate the high resilience
of RF-Rhythm to brute force, visual eavesdropping, and RF
eavesdropping attacks. We also confirm the high usability of
RF-Rhythm by a user survey.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives some necessary background about RFID systems. Sec-
tion III describes the adversary model. Section IV provides
an overview of RF-Rhythm. Section V details the design of
RF-Rhythm. Section VI presents the phase-hopping protocol
for anti-eavesdropping. Section VII reports the experimental
evaluation of RF-Rhythm. Section VIII briefs the related work.
II. BASICS OF PASSIVE UHF RFID SYSTEMS
In this section, we introduce some necessary background
about passive Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) RFID systems to
help illustrate the RF-Rhythm design later. An RFID system
consists of a backend server, readers, and RFID cards. The
RFID reader sends both modulated commands and continuous
wave (CW). The RFID card sends back its data by exploring
the energy harvested from the reader’s signals to switch its
input impedance between two states and thus modulate the
backscattered signal. EPC Gen 2 [5] is the most popular UHF
RFID standard and assumed throughout the remainder of this
paper.
RFID cards encode the backscattered data using either
FM0 baseband or miller modulation. We only consider FM0
encoding in this paper, but our work can easily extend to
miller modulation. Fig. 1 shows the basic FM0 symbols. FM0
inverts the baseband phase at every symbol boundary with an
Data-0
Data-1
Tpri
0 01 1 v 1
FM0 Preamble
Fig. 1. FM0 baseband symbols and preamble.
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Fig. 2. The basic EPC Gen-2 query protocol with a single RFID card.
additional mid-symbol phase inversion for each data-0. The
duration of an FM0 symbol is denoted by Tpri = 1/BLF,
where BLF represents the backscatter link frequency ranging
from 40 kHz to 640 kHz [5]. To ease our presentation, we
assume BLF equal to 40 kHz, corresponding to Tpri = 25µs.
Fig. 2 shows the basic query protocol in EPC Gen-2 [5].
1) The reader emits CW of length T4 for the RFID card to
harvest and store energy.
2) The reader sends a Query command followed by CW
of length T1 + T2 + TRN16. During this CW period, the
card backscatters an RN16 message comprising a 6-bit
preamble, a 16-bit random number, and one dummy bit.
3) The reader sends an ACK followed by CW of length
T1 + T2 + TEPC. During this CW period, the card
backscatters its EPC (Electronic Product Code).
4) The reader sends QueryRep to finish this query session.
EPC Gen-2 [5] gives recommendations for the above timing
parameters. Let RTcal represent the duration of Interrogator-
to-Tag calibration symbol, which is specified in the reader
configuration and set to RTcal = 72µs in our implementation.
Also let FrT be the frequency tolerance of FM0 baseband
signals, which equals 4% for BLF = 40 KHz. We have T4 =
2RTcal = 144µs and 75µs ≤ T2 ≤ 500µs. In addition, the
maximum, minimum, and nominal values of T1 are 262µs,
238µs, and 250µs, respectively.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume an adversary A who attempts to use a
lost/stolen/cloned RFID card to pass authentication checks and
thus impersonate the legitimate card user. A knows how RF-
Rhythm works and can perform rhythmic taps on the RFID
card with fingers or even a fully programmable robotic arm.
We assume that A does not know the legitimate user’s secret
song segment and can try the following attack strategies.
• Brute force: A performs totally random rhythmic taps.
• Visual eavesdropping: A observes the legitimate user’s
tapping behavior, e.g., by shoulder surfing or a spy
camera, and then tries to emulate it.
• RF eavesdropping: A sniffs all the PHY communication
traces between the RFID reader and card to recover and
then perform the legitimate user’s rhythmic taps.
Feature
Extraction
Rhythm Learning/
Classification
Matching
Rhythm Detection
Anti-eavesdropping RFID Protocol
Signal 
Processing
Random Phase 
Hopping Sequence 
Generator
RFID 
Reader
Backend
Server
Phase
Fig. 3. The RF-Rhythm system flowchart.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
RF-Rhythm consists of an enrollment phase and a verifica-
tion phase, and its major modules are depicted in Fig. 3,
During the enrollment phase, the legitimate user first selects
an arbitrary song segment familiar to him/herself. Then the
user performs rhythmic taps on his/her RFID card in ac-
cordance with his/her own interpretation of the chosen song
segment, e.g., by singing it silently. The user’s tapping rhythm
is referred to as his/her secret rhythm hereafter.
The security of RF-Rhythm relies on the secrecy of the
chosen song segment and also the user’s likely unique tapping
rhythm. In particular, since there are numerous songs available,
the adversary can hardly guess the selected song segment of a
target user; an advanced user such as a musician can even self-
compose the song segment. In addition, people may have very
subjective mental interpretations about the same song segment,
resulting in totally different tapping rhythms.
The backend server handles the enrollment request as fol-
lows. First, it acquires the EPC of the user’s RFID card through
the reader as usual by using the protocol in Fig. 2. Second, it
instructs the user to perform rhythmic taps on the RFID card,
which would lead to phase changes in the backscattered signals
received by the reader. Third, the server invokes a Signal
Processing module to extract reliable phase data from noisy
backscattered signals. Fourth, it uses a Feature Extraction
module to obtain a feature vector that characterizes the use’s
tapping rhythm. Finally, it asks the user to repeat the rhythmic
taps multiple times and then feeds all the resulting feature
vectors into a Rhythm Learning module to train a high-quality
binary rhythm classifier for this user.
In the verification phase, the backend server first explores
the RFID card for its EPC with the protocol in Fig. 2. If the
EPC is found in the database, the server instructs the reader to
execute multiple rounds of the protocol again in Fig. 2. RF-
Rhythm is highly usable in the sense that the RFID user just
needs to perform his/her secret tapping rhythm multiple times
without the need to know when the server starts to extract it in
both the enrollment and verification phases. The server invokes
the same Signal Processing and Feature Extraction modules to
extract a candidate tapping rhythm in each round, which is then
tested with the trained rhythm classifier associated with the
EPC acquired before. The authentication process terminates
until when the server either detects a valid tapping rhythm or
fails to detect one after a threshold number of rounds. The
Fig. 4. Absolute phase changes induced by rhythmic taps on an RFID card.
RFID card and corresponding user are considered authentic in
the former case and fake in the latter.
RF-Rhythm features a novel anti-eavesdropping protocol
employed by the RFID reader to emit CW with random
phases for extracting the user’s secret tapping rhythm in both
enrollment and verification phases. Our protocol can prevent
a capable adversary from recovering and then replaying the
legitimate user’s secret rhythm from sniffed RFID signals.
Our descriptions above focus on very cheap COTS RFID
cards and can also be easily adapted to more powerful, ex-
pensive cryptographic RFID cards. For example, the EPC can
just be replaced by a cryptographic authentication message.
We ignore this option henceforth for ease of illustration.
V. RF-RHYTHM DESIGN DETAILS
A. Feasibility Study: Tap Detection
The backscattered signal’s phase is readily available on
commercial RFID readers such as Impinj R420 [6]. According
to [7], it can be expressed as φ = ( 4pidfc + φreader + φcard)
mod 2pi, where 2d is the round-trip propagation distance
between the reader and card, f is the CW frequency, c is
the speed of light, φreader denotes the phase rotation due to the
reader’s transmit and receive circuits, and φcard represents the
phase rotation caused by the RFID card’s reflection character-
istics.
Finger taps on the RFID card can change its circuit
impedance and also signal propagation, leading to some addi-
tional phase rotation denoted by φtap. So we modify the phase
expression above to
φ =
(4pidf
c
+ φreader + φcard
)
+ φtap mod 2pi. (1)
To better understand the effect of finger taps, we per-
form a simple experiment using a Impinj R420 reader and
a SMARTRAC R6 DogBone tag. Fig. 4 shows the phase
changes induced by rhythmic finger taps on the RFID card
in accordance with the shown song segment. We also show
the phase change associated with a single tap in Fig. 5. A
tap event can be decomposed into a press stage and a release
stage. So we use [tpress, trelease] to represent a tap event in the
time domain, where tpress and trelease denote the time that the
phase (difference) starts to change and return to the baseline
value, respectively. Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b depict the absolute
phase values and the difference between adjacent phase values,
respectively. These results clearly demonstrate the feasibility
of exploring phase changes for tap detection.
0pi/2
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tpress trelease
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Fig. 5. Absolute and differential phase changes caused by a single tap.
B. Data Processing
We represent the reader’s phase report at time ti by
[φi, fi, ti], where fi denotes the CW frequency at ti. Accord-
ing to Eq. (1), we have
φi =
(4pidfi
c
+ φreader + φcard
)
+ φtap,i mod 2pi , (2)
where φtap,i denotes the phase shift during the ith tap. The
interval ti+1 − ti (i ≥ 0) is about 4ms on the Impinj R420
reader. We temporarily assume that fi is constant and perform
the following steps to process the raw phase data to extract
more useful information for further rhythm extraction.
Phase difference and unwrapping. We use the phase dif-
ference instead of the absolute phase to eliminate the ap-
proximately constant 4pidfic + φreader + φcard during adjacent
tap events. In addition, the raw phase data are wrapped
within [0, 2pi], so it is critical to perform phase unwrapping
to eliminate ambiguity. Our experiments reveal that although
the phase change induced by tap events are sharp, it is always
bounded by pi. According to this finding, the unwrapped phase
difference is calculated by
∆φi = φtap,i−φtap,i−1 =
 φi − φi−1, |φi − φi−1| ≤ ηφi − φi−1 + 2pi, φi − φi−1 < −η
φi − φi−1 − 2pi, φi − φi−1 > η
(3)
Here η is an empirical value set to 3.5 in this paper.
Normalization. Since the sampling rate of the RFID reader is
not consistent, so we further derive the time-normalized phase
difference as
∆φi =
∆φi
∆ti
=
∆φi
ti − ti−1 . (4)
Interpolation and filtering. We further use a linear interpo-
lation with a factor of 4 and a 15-point average value filter
to smooth the data and also mitigate the noise. We denote the
final smoothed data by Φ = [∆φ1,∆φ2, . . . ,∆φN ], where N
denotes the total number of data points.
C. Mitigating Frequency Hopping
We intend RF-Rhythm to be a universal solution worldwide
and thus must deal with frequency hopping mandated in many
regions. For example, FCC requires that all RFID readers used
in the US apply frequency hopping across 50 channels ranging
from 902 to 928 MHz with the dwell time on each interval no
larger than 0.4 seconds. According to Eq. (2), such frequency
hopping naturally leads to phase discontinuity in Fig. 6a.
To see the effect of frequency hopping more clearly, assume
that frequency hopping occurs at ti (i ≥ 2). In the Impinj
R420 reader, the frequency-hopping interval is 200ms, while
the phase-report interval is about 4ms. So there is no frequency
hopping at ti−2, ti−1, and ti+1, i.e., fi−2 = fi−1 6= fi = fi+1.
The phase difference in Eq. (3) is in effect
∆φi = φtap,i − φtap,i−1 +
(4pidfi
c
− 4pidfi−1
c
)
.
Since d is unknown and hard to estimate in practice, we
cannot do a simple calibration by subtracting the term in
the parenthesis from ∆φi. Instead, we compute the time-
normalized phase difference for ti as
∆φi = (∆φi+1 + ∆φi−1)
ti − ti−1
ti+1 − ti−1 (5)
Fig. 6b plots the output of the Data Processing module
corresponding to Fig. 6a after we adopt the above technique.
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Fig. 6. Data processing under frequency hopping.
D. Feature Extraction
Since a tapping rhythm consists of individual taps and tap-
durations, we first seek to extract individual tap events from the
processed phase data Φ = [∆φ1,∆φ2, . . . ,∆φN ]. Recall that
each tap event can be represented by [tpress, trelease]. We draw
three observations from Fig. 5b obtained from preliminary
experiments. First, the start and end of a tap event correspond
to the phase difference beginning to deviate from and return
to the zero baseline, respectively. Second, the phase difference
first decreases from and then returns to the zero baseline
when the user finger goes from just touching to fully pressing
on the RFID card, leading to a local minimum. Finally, the
phase difference first increases from and then returns to the
zero baseline when the user finger goes from decreasing the
pressure on to completely leaving the RFID card, resulting in
a local maximum. The later two observations are both because
the card impedance gradually change with the finger pressure
on the card during a tap event. Armed with these observations,
we use the following empirical process
1) Find all the local maximums above δ1 and minimums
below δ2 in Φ.
2) Pair each local minimum with the immediate local
maximum (if any) such that there are no other local
minimums or maximums in between. We require the
user’s tapping rhythm to be sufficiently long such that
M  2 local minimum-maximum pairs can be located
in Φ, each associated with a unique tap event.
IQ
S1
S2
LV
B
V
Fig. 7. Complex demodulated signals received by the reader.
3) Find the first data point before (after) the local minimum
(maximum) which is within ±δ3 from the zero baseline
for each local minim-maximum pair. The corresponding
timestamp is used as tpress (trelease) of the tap event.
The thresholds δ1, δ2, and δ3 can be obtained empirically
through experiments.
Finally, we obtain an M -tap event sequence as
V =
[
tpress,1 tpress,2 . . . tpress,M
trelease,1 trelease,2 . . . trelease,M
]
, (6)
from which we can derive a feature vector F =
[F1, . . . , FM−1], where Fi = tpress,i+1 − trelease,i.
E. Rhythm Classification
The backend server builds a rhythm classifier during the
enrollment phase. To do so, it instructs the user to perform
rhythmic taps in accordance with his/her secret song segment
multiple times. The resulting phase-difference vectors may
vary due to slight tapping variations. So we apply Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [8] to align all the phase-difference
vectors to that of the first acquired tapping rhythm. Then we
obtain a feature vector from each aligned phase-difference
vector and pad zeros in the end (if needed) to make all the
feature vectors have the same length. Finally, we use the
resulting feature vectors to train a rhythm classifier based
an any established machine learning technique. We compare
the performance of one-vs-all linear Support Vector Machine
(SVM), Neural Networks (NN), and Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) in Section VII. During each authentication
session, the server explores the same processes to extract a
tapping rhythm and then test it with the rhythm classifier.
VI. ANTI-EAVESDROPPING VIA PHASE HOPPING
In this section, we present a novel phase-hopping technique
to prevent a capable adversary from acquiring the legitimate
tapping rhythm from sniffed RFID signals. In what follows,
we first illustrate the rhythm-eavesdropping attack, followed
by the motivation for using phase hopping as a defense. Then
we detail the protocol design and analyze its security.
A. Rhythm-Eavesdropping Attack
We first explain the principle with which the RFID reader
extracts the signals backscattered by the RFID card. As shown
in Fig. 1, there are two possible voltage levels in FM0 symbols.
The card only backscatters when transmitting high-voltage
pulses. Consider the query protocol in Fig. 2. The symbols
received by the reader between its two consecutive commands
(e.g., Query and ACK) can be classified into two states (S1
Data-0
CW phase 
shift π/6 π/3
(a)
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S12LV
BV
'
BV
'

1LV
(b)
Fig. 8. Illustration of reader-phase hopping.
and S2). The symbols in S1 contain only constant CW, while
those in S2 are the superposition of CW and backscattered
signals. For simplicity, we represent the symbols in S1 and
S2 by two single points in the complex I-Q plane in Fig. 7,
corresponding to vector ~VL and ~VB , respectively. The phase
of backscattered signals can be derived as [9]
φ = arccos(
~VB · ~VL∣∣∣ ~VB∣∣∣∣∣∣ ~VB∣∣∣ ). (7)
The phase reports from the reader correspond to the samples of
φ above. As said, the phase-sampling frequency in the Impinj
R420 reader is about 4ms.
To launch the rhythm-eavesdropping attack, the adversary
can just passively sniff the reader-card communications with
its own RFID reader or a software-defined radio. After clas-
sifying sniffed symbols into S1 and S2, it uses the same
process above to extract φ. Next, it explores the workflow
in Section V to acquire the legitimate tapping rhythm. Finally,
it can carefully study the tapping rhythm and reproduce it
by hand or even through a programmable robotic arm on
the lost/stolen/cloned RFID card. Since this attack directly
exploits physical-layer RFID signals, it cannot be thwarted by
encrypting RFID protocol messages at the application layer.
B. Phase Hopping to Mitigate Rhythm Eavesdropping
We propose to let the RFID reader emit CW with random
phases to counteract the rhythm-eavesdropping attack. The
objective is to prevent the adversary from obtaining matching
symbols in states S1 and S2, so it cannot derive the correct
phases of backscattered signals as in Fig. 7.
Fig. 8 explains the intuition of our defense. Assume that
the RFID card is backscattering a data-0 symbol. As said
above, the card only backscatters the high-voltage part. As
shown in Fig. 8a, we let the reader set the CW phases to pi/6
and pi/3 during backscattering and non-backscattering, respec-
tively. The adversary again tries to cluster sniffed symbols into
states S1 and S2. Due to phase hopping, the S1 symbols that
correspond to non-backscattering has a phase offset of pi/3,
labeled by S1′ in Fig. 8b. The true S1 symbol matching the S2
symbol, however, should have a phase offset of pi/6, labeled
by S1 in Fig. 8b. Since the adversary does not know the true
CW phase during backscattering, it can only use the symbols
in S1′ and S2 to derive a wrong phase φ′. But the reader
knows the true CW phase or S1 symbol and can thus derive
the correct phase φ.
Query CW Query CW Query CW
120τ
Random Phase Hopping
T1’ nτ 10τ T2’
Phase Recovery
CW
Fig. 9. Timing diagram of phase hopping.
C. Protocol Design
It is very challenging to properly implement the phase-
hopping idea above. In particular, our example in Fig. 8
assumes perfect reader-tag synchronization such that the reader
knows exactly when backscattering occurs and thus when to
change the CW phase. This assumption is impossible to hold
in practice. Therefore, the adversary may still be able to obtain
matching symbols in S1 and S2 to derive the correct phase and
eventually the legitimate tapping rhythm. A tempting solution
is using a very short hopping interval, which nevertheless
may negatively affect the reader’s capability to recover the
correct phase and thus the tapping rhythm. It is thus critical
to determine the optimal phase-hopping interval to strike a
balance between attack resilience and system correctness.
We illustrate our phase-hopping protocol with a simplified
version of the query protocol in Fig. 2. Assume that the
backend server acquires and validates the card’s EPC with the
protocol in Fig. 2. It then instructs the RFID reader to initiate
additional query rounds to acquire the user’s tapping rhythm.
Each query round consists of a Query message followed by
a CW period of length T1 + T2 + TRN16, where T1 and T2
are random variables mentioned in Section II. In the original
RFID protocol, the CW phase is constant. Our goal now is
to determine when phase hopping should start/stop and how
often it should be in each CW period.
The begin and end of phase hopping depend on T1. Ac-
cording to Section II, T1 is in [238µs, 262µs] with the nominal
value equal to 250µs. We also measure the actual distribution
of T1 over 5,639 card replies. Since 98.92% of T1 are between
244µs to 247µs, it is safe to conclude that if the phase-
hopping duration covers [244µs, 247µs+TRN16], almost all the
backscattered signals associated with RN16 can be covered.
The next challenge is to determine the hopping interval τ ,
which should be as short as possible for high attack resilience.
The minimum τ is hardware-specific and empirically set
to τ = Tpri5 = 5µs in our USRP implementation, where
Tpri = 1/BLF = 25µs denotes the FM0 symbol duration
introduced in Section II. Ideally speaking, each CW phase
value leads to a unique pair of S1 and S2 symbols as shown
in Fig. 7. In practice, we can only obtain two clusters of
symbols associated with S1 and S2, respectively, which are
referred to the S1 and S2 clusters for convenience. The RFID
reader needs to obtain the matching S1 and S2 clusters for at
least one random CW phase to recover the correct phase for
the backscattered RN16. Our experiments reveal that strictly
sticking to τ would induce too many randomly distributed
symbols in the I-Q plane, which make it very difficult for the
reader to do proper symbol clustering.
We tackle the above issue by introducing a short phase-
discovery period lasting γ that must satisfy two requirements.
First, it starts from a random hopping interval hard to predict
by the adversary. Second, it covers at least one phase inversion
in the FM0 symbols of the RN16 message. An RN16 message
comprises a 6-bit preamble, a 16-bit random number, and one
dummy bit. According to FM0 encoding in Fig. 1, there is
a phase inversion at every symbol boundary and also one
in the middle of each data-0 symbol, but the FM0 preamble
contains a phase-inversion violation at the fifth symbol labeled
“v”. So the longest time that the RFID card does not invert
the signal phase is 1.5Tpri. Since the reader does not know
when backscattering (i.e., the RN16 transmission) starts, we
set γ = 2Tpri = 10τ to satisfy both requirements above.
The phase-discovery period obviously consists of 10 hopping
intervals. In addition, the reader uses the same CW phase in the
odd-numbered hopping intervals and performs random phase
hopping in the rest intervals of the phase-discovery period.
Now we explain the protocol details with the timing diagram
in Fig. 9. After sending the Query message, the RFID reader
starts the phase-hopping duration at T ′1 which is divided into
short hopping intervals of τ = 5µs long. We require the phase-
hopping duration to at least cover the range [244µs, 247µs +
TRN16], where TRN16 = 575µs [5]. So we set T ′1 = 240µs and
the phase-hopping duration to 600µs long which corresponds
to 120 hopping intervals. For each rhythm-query round, the
reader determines 24 CW phase values
Θ = [θinit, θinit + 1, θinit + 2, . . . , θinit + 23], (8)
where θinit is a random integer from [0, 360). Assume that the
phase-recovery period starts at T ′1 + nτ , where n ∈ [0, 110]
is randomly chosen by the reader because the phase-hopping
duration lasts 120 hopping intervals. In addition, the reader
randomly selects θreserve ∈ Θ and uses it for the five odd-
numbered hopping intervals (represented by lined blocks) in
the phase-recovery period. Finally, the reader performs random
phase hopping across the remaining 23 phase values in the rest
115 hopping intervals (represented by gray blocks) such that
each phase value in Θ (including θreserve) is used exactly five
times in each rhythm-query round.
Fig. 10 gives an example for the efficacy of our protocol,
which is based on our prototyping implementation on a USRP
2954R device. The phase-hopping duration is from 0.1s to
0.7s, and the reader’s received signals in the phase-recovery
period are enclosed by the black rectangle. Since the reader
knows exactly when the phase-recovery period starts, it can
precisely locate the symbols associated with the constant
phase θreserve. As shown in Fig. 10b, the reader can easily
cluster these symbols into states S1 and S2 whereby to extract
the correct phase of backscattered signals. To highlight the
correctness of our protocol, we also show complete phase plots
obtained by the reader in Fig. 10d with our phase-hopping
protocol, which match well with those on a traditional RFID
reader without phase hopping [6]. In contrast, the adversary
does not know when the phase-recover period starts. So it has
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Fig. 10. Effect of reader-phase hopping.
to exploit all the sniffed symbols for phase recovery, which is
almost impossible as shown in Fig. 10c.
D. Resilient Analysis against Advanced Eavesdropping
The proposed phase-hopping protocol can thwart basic
eavesdropping attacks in which the adversary has only one
sniffer that overhears the superposition of the backscattered
signal and CW with random phase hopping. Now we analyze
its resilience to advanced eavesdropping attacks in which the
adversary has an additional sniffer at distance d1 from the
reader and d2 from the card. The adversary can also vary d1
and d2 arbitrarily. Theoretically speaking, the second sniffer
also receives the superposition of the backscattered signal and
CW with random phase hopping. Assume that the adversary
can make d2 large enough such that the backscattered signal
is attenuated too much to detect, while keeping d1 sufficiently
small such that the CW signal is still strong enough. The signal
overheard by the second sniffer thus corresponds to CW alone.
The adversary can then derive the phase-hopping sequence
and correlate it with the signals obtained by the first sniffer to
recover the phase information of backscattered signals.
To analyze the feasibility of the advanced eavesdropping
attack above, we assume the free-space path loss (FSPL)
model for RFID signal propagation, FSPL = ( 4pidλ )
2, where
d is the distance between antennas, and λ is the CW wave-
length. Assume that the RFID card is at distance d0 from
the reader. The power of the reader’s signal at the card is
Pcard = PtGt(
λ
4pid0
)2, where Pt is the reader’s transmission
power, d0 is the distance between reader, and Gt is the
reader’s antenna gain. According to [10], the EIRP (Equivalent
Isotropically Radiated Power) of passive RFID cards is
EIRPcard = Preader
4piσ
λ2
= PtGt
σ
4pid20
, (9)
where σ denotes the tag’s radar cross section (RCS) [10]. σ
mainly depends on the impedance of card antenna and chip
and depicts the backscattered power strength tag.
The second sniffer receives the superposition of CW and
the backscattered signal. The signal strength for CW can be
expressed by
PCW,d1 =
PtGtGr
FSPLreader
= PtGtGr(
λ
4pid1
)2 ,
where Gr denotes the second sniffer’s antenna gain. Simi-
larly, the signal strength for the backscattered signal can be
expressed by
PBS,d2 =
EIRPcardGr
FSPLreader
= PtGtGr
σλ2
(4pi)3d20d
2
2
.
Let τrx and τdec denote the minimum signal strengths that the
sniffer can detect and decode RFID signals, respectively. The
advanced eavesdropping attack works if and only if PCW,d1 ≥
τdec and PBS,d2 ≤ τrx can simultaneously hold. It is equivalent
for the adversary to find d1 and d2 that satisfy
d1 ≤
√
PtGtGr
τdec
(
λ
4pi
)2
and
d2 ≥
√
PtGtGr
τrx
σλ2
(4pi)3d20
.
The above requirement corresponds a vulnerable region out-
side the circle centered at the card with radius d2 and inside
the circle centered at the reader with radius d1. In Section VII,
we experimentally show that the vulnerable region can be very
difficult or infeasible to find in practice.
VII. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
We used two Impinj R420 readers (GX21M and USA2M1
models) with Laird S9028 antenna. GX21M does not use
frequency hopping, while USA2M1 does. The data from
USA2M1 were calibrated with the method in Section V-C and
then combined with the data from GX21M. We used three
types of RFID tags, including SMARTRAC R6 DogBone,
Impinj E51, and Alien 9640. In addition, we prototyped the
phase-hopping protocol on a USRP 2954R and also used an
R&S FSVR7 real-time spectrum analyzer for signal analysis.
We compared the classification performance of SVM, NN,
and CNN. The comparison was based on the SVM toolbox
in Matlab and the NN and CNN implementations in PyTorch.
We used a fully connected NN with one hidden layer and
256 perceptions. In addition, the CNN we used has two 1D
convolutional layers and a kernel size of 2. All the training and
classification procedures were performed on a Ubuntu desktop
with i7-8700k CPU and 16 GB RAM.
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY (%) WITH LEGITIMATE USERS AND BRUTE
FORCE ATTACKERS.
SVM NN CNN
K train test train test train test
4 100 91.97 100 91.05 98.29 85.75
5 100 92.48 100 90.44 98.13 87.92
6 100 92.27 100 92.07 98.42 87.39
7 100 92.96 99.87 92.50 98.57 88.68
8 100 93.05 100 92.29 98.29 91.83
9 100 92.50 100 93.45 98.16 90.26
10 100 93.82 100 93.16 98.42 93.68
15 100 94.65 100 94.19 98.81 94.88
20 100 95.39 100 94.21 99.47 96.58
We recruited 19 volunteers from China and US who are
either undergraduate or graduate students. Each volunteer
tapped a random RFID tag 40 times according to his/her self-
chosen rhythm. Most chosen rhythms last 6s to 12s with the
average and variance equal to 9.61s and 5.86s, respectively.
The RFID reader-tag distance was always about 40 inches. We
collected 760 tapping rhythm samples in total.
B. Performance Results with Legitimate Users (Resilience to
Brute Force Attacks)
We first evaluate the performance of RF-Rhythm under the
brute force attack. For this evaluation, we randomly choose K
rhythm samples from all the 19 volunteers to form a training
set of 19K samples to train a classifier for each volunteer.
The remaining rhythm samples are treated as the testing set.
We do this evaluation 10 times for each volunteer and report
the average result. When the classifier of each volunteer is
tested against the data samples of all the other 18 volunteers,
it amounts to launching a brute forth attack on RF-Rhythm.
Table I shows the training and testing accuracy with SVM,
NN, and CNN classifiers, where (classification) accuracy is
defined as the percentage of correct predictions. Overall, RF-
Rhythm can admit legitimate users and reject random impos-
tors with overwhelming probability under all three classifiers.
In addition, both SVM and NN work very well even when
K is very small. A smaller K means a legitimate user can
input his/her tapping rhythm fewer times in the enrollment
phase, leading to shorter enrollment time and higher usability.
In contrast, CNN needs more training data to outperform SVM
and NN in the testing phase, which is anticipated.
Fig. 11 demonstrates the true-positive rate (TPR), true-
negative rate (TNR), false-negative rate (FNR), and false
positive rate (FPR) for SVM. Here we use the box plots with
the 0th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 100th percentiles shown. The
high classification performance of RF-Rhythm is quite clear.
Similar results are obtained for NN and CNN as well and
omitted here due to space constraints.
Since the same user may perform enrollment and authenti-
cation at a different distance from the RFID reader, we also
evaluate the impact of this distance factor. In this experiment,
we place an RFID card at 20, 40, 80, and 120 inches from
the RFID reader and let a random volunteer input his tapping
rhythm 40 times at each testing location. Then we train a
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Fig. 11. Classification performance of RF-Rhythm using SVM.
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY FOR ENROLLMENT-AUTHENTICATION
LOCATION VARIATIONS.
SVM NN CNN
T1 T2 T3 T4 T1 T2 T3 T4 T1 T2 T3 T4
E1 1.0 0.925 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.925 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.975 0.9 0.95
E2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.925 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.95 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.95
E3 0.95 1.0 0.92 0.925 1.0 0.95 1.0 0.95 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.95
E4 0.95 1.0 1.0 0.92 1.0 1.0 0.95 0.95 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
classifier for the volunteer at each location by using his
rhythm samples collected there and the samples of all the
other 18 volunteers as the training data. Finally, we test
each obtained classifier against the volunteer’s rhythm samples
collected at the same and different locations. Table II shows
the classification accuracy for this evaluation, where E1&T1,
E2&T2, E3&T3, and E4&T4 denote the enrollment and testing
locations at 20, 40, 80, and 120 inches, respectively. If the
enrollment and testing locations are the same, we randomly
divide the volunteer’s samples at that location into 2 parts for
training and testing, respectively; otherwise, all the 40 samples
are used for training in each enrollment location. The results
represent the average of 10 runs. It is clear that RF-Rhythm
is robust to enrollment-authentication location variations.
C. Resilience to Visual Eavesdropping
We also evaluate the resilience of RF-Rhythm to visual
eavesdropping. In this evaluation, we use a high-definition
smartphone to video-record each volunteer’s entire rhythm-
tapping process. Then we recruit five volunteers that act as
attackers to watch all the 19 videos and then emulate the
tapping rhythms they observe. We consider two scenarios.
First, each attacker has a one-time watching of each video
and then tries to perform the observed rhythm once. This
scenario emulates the shoulder-surfing attack. Second, each
attacker can watch each video as many times as they want
and then performs each perceived rhythm four times. This
scenario emulates the video-taping attack via a spy camera. We
totally collect 475 attack samples. Then we build a classifier
for each of the 19 volunteers with all the aforementioned 760
rhythm samples as the training data. Finally, we test each
attack sample with the corresponding volunteer’s classifer.
Table III shows the rejection rate for visual eavesdroppers,
which represents the average of 10 runs. We can see that RF-
Rhythm has strong resilience to visual eavesdroppers under
all three classification methods. In addition, a visual eaves-
dropper can intuitively achieve a higher success rate with
more observations and authentication attempts. RF-Rhythm
TABLE III
REJECTION RATE (%) FOR VISUAL EAVESDROPPERS.
SVM NN CNN
one observation, one try 94.74 94.63 96.32
arbitrary observations, 4 tries 93.42 93.53 93.87
can rate-limit unsuccessful authentication attempts to provide
a stronger defense.
D. Resilience to Basic Rhythm Eavesdropping
Next we examine the efficacy of our phase-hopping pro-
tocol to a rhythm eavesdropper with a single sniffer. As
shown in Fig. 10c, the adversary can roughly cluster sniffed
symbols into states S1 and S2, respectively. But it cannot
precisely find the matching S1 and S2 symbols of the same
CW phase. We assume that the adversary is very powerful
and knows how our phase-hopping protocol works. Since
the CW phase in each query round takes random values in
Θ = [θinit, θinit + 1, θinit + 2, . . . , θinit + 23], we wwwassume
that the adversary can estimate a candidate phase vector Θ′
from sniffed S1 symbols. Due to noise, interference, and
processing errors, Θ′ may overlap but is usually much larger
than Θ. The symbols in Θ′ can be much fewer than sniffed
S1 symbols. Then the adversary picks an arbitrary sniffed S2
symbol, denoted by s2, and uses each S1 symbol in Θ′ as a
candidate matching symbol for s2 to derive a candidate phase
of the backscattered RN16. The probability of a correct guess
is simply 1/|Θ′|. Each rhythm-query round is about 2.179ms
long, and the average tapping-rhythm duration is 9.61s in our
experiments. So we need about 4,410 rounds to cover and
detect an average tapping rhythm. The probability that the
adversary can recover the correct tapping rhythm from sniffed
signals can be estimated by P˜ = (1/|Θ′|)n. For example, if
|Θ′| = 24|48|72, the adversary can succeed with negligible
probability. Therefore, our phase-hopping protocol is highly
effective against the basic rhythm-eavesdropping attack.
E. Resilience to Advanced Rhythm Eavesdropping
We also evaluate the resilience of RF-Rhythm to advanced
rhythm-eavesdropping attacks in which the adversary has two
sniffers at strategic locations. In Section VI-D, we identify a
theoretical vulnerable region in which this attack can succeed.
In this section, we show that the vulnerable region may not
be easily found by an adversary with reasonable equipment.
In this evaluation, we assume that the adversary places
his second sniffer d1 from the RFID reader and d2 from
the RFID card. For simplicity, we assume that the reader,
tag, and sniffer are on the straight line. This is a reasonable
assumption because most commonly used RFID antennas are
directional with a relatively focused and narrow radio wave
beam. We implement a EPC Gen2 RFID reader prototype [11]
on an NI USRP 2954R and assume that the adversary has a
similar sniffer device. We also use an R&S FSVR7 real-time
spectrum analyzer for signal measurements. Recall that τrx and
τdec denote the minimum signal strengths that the sniffer can
detect and decode RFID signals, respectively. According to our
measurements, τrx = −81.21dBm and τdec = −55.98dBm.
TABLE IV
POWER MEASUREMENTS FOR ADVANCED RHYTHM EAVESDROPPING.
d0/inch PCW,d1/dBm PBS,d2/dBm PCW,d1 − PBS,d2/dBm
10 -3.30 -27.91 24.61
40 -7.98 -27.00 20.78
80 -10.15 -24.02 14.53
120 -14.52 -26.43 12.29
To emulate the attack, we vary the RFID card-reader dis-
tance d0 from 10 to 40, 80, and 120 inches. For each d0
value, we measure the CW signal strength PCW,d1 and the
backscattered signal strength PBS,d2 at d2 = 40 inches from
the RFID card, which also corresponds to d1 = d0+40 inches.
This location is regarded as the sniffer’s initial location. The
results are shown in Table IV. Since we assume the reader-
card-sniffer line topology, PCW,d1 and PBS,d2 are attenuated
by the same amount when d2 and equivalently d1 increase.
According to our analysis in Section VI-D, the advanced
eavesdropping attack succeeds if and only if PCW,d1 ≥ τdec
and PBS,d2 ≤ τrx can simultaneously hold. This requires
PCW,d1 − PBS,d2 ≥ τdec − τrx = 25.23dBm per our mea-
surements. This requirement cannot be satisfied according to
Table IV, so the advanced eavesdropping attack would fail.
It is possible that a more capable adversary with advanced
equipment can successfully overhear the legitimate user’s tap-
ping rhythm. Instead of being a perfect solution, RF-Rhythm,
however, just aims to enhance the security of a traditional
RFID authentication system that is naturally vulnerable to
lost/stolen/cloned RFID cards. In other words, RF-Rhythm
significantly raises the bar for launching successful attacks on
RFID authentication systems.
F. Additional Results
We also evaluate the computational latency of RF-Rhythm.
Our results show that the classifier training can be done in a
few seconds, and each tapping rhythm can be classified in less
than 1ms. In addition, we use a questionnaire to confirm the
high usability of RF-Rhythm. These results are omitted here
due to space constraints.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Rhythm-based authentication for mobile devices has been
explored. RhyAuth [3] is a two-factor rhythm-based authen-
tication scheme for multi-touch mobile devices. It requires a
user to perform a sequence of rhythmic taps/slides on a device
screen to unlock the device. In the follow-on work, Beat-PIN
[4] requires a user to tap the screen of a smartwatch to unlock
it. RF-Rhythm differs significantly from RhyAuth and Beat-
PIN in the application context, totally different rhythm-extract
techniques, adversary models, and countermeasures.
There is also significant effort on RFID security. For ex-
ample, novel cryptographic RFID authentication protocols are
presented in [12]–[14]. Haitham [15] proposes RF-Cloak to
prevent eavesdropping attacks by randomizing the modulation
and channel. Selective jamming is proposed in [16] to prevent
unauthorized inquiries to RFID tags. Zanetti and Danev [17]
explore the time interval error, average baseband power and
spectral features to fingerprint RFID tags. TapPrint [18] uses
the phase of backscattered signals combined with the geomet-
ric relationship to fingerprint RFID tags. Hu-Fu [19] uses the
inductive coupling of two tags to fingerprint them. RF-Mehndi
[20] identifies an RFID card and its user simultaneously by
exploring the backscattered signal changes induced by the
user’s fingertip on a specially build passive tag array. RF-
Rhythm explores COTS RFID tags and is complimentary to
the above work.
The phase information of backscattered RFID signals has
been explored in many applications, such as gesture recog-
nition [21], [22], action recognition [23], [24], orientation
tracking [25], mechanical features sensing [26], [27], and
localization [28]. RF-Rhythm is the first work to extract
a tapping rhythm from backscattered RFID signals and is
orthogonal to the above work.
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